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SR Construction, Inc. v. Peek Brothers Construction, Inc., 138 Nev. Adv. Op. 41 (June 2, 2022)1
CONTRACT AND COMMERCIAL LAW: APPLICATION OF THE PAROL EVIDENCE
RULE IN CONTRACT INTERPRETATION.

Summary
The Supreme Court, reviewing an appeal from the district court’s denial to compel arbitration,
contemplated the scope of and applicability of a master subcontractor agreement’s arbitration
clause when the language did not unequivocally compel subcontractors to arbitrate disputes. The
Court held that where the arbitration provision of a contract is broad, the presumption toward
arbitrability prevails.
Facts
Contractor, SR Construction, Inc., and subcontractor, Peek Brother Construction, Inc. entered into
a Master Subcontractor Agreement “MSA”. This overarching agreement would govern the terms
of the collaboration between the two parties when performing work under prime contracts. One
such prime contract was the project with United Health Services of Delaware (“UHS”) for the
erection of a new building. Prior to commencing work under the new UHS project, SR and Peek
discussed terms including compensation, means, and methods, and began executing the work in
accordance with the prime contract.
During the construction of the UHS building, Peek deviated from methods for performance
stipulated to in the prior agreement. These changes resulted in resulting in $140,000 in costs
beyond what was estimated in the bid for service. UHS rejected the unauthorized charges and
instructed the appellant to commence the process of arbitration. Prior to the appellant doing so, the
respondent sued to recover costs. SR moved to compel arbitration in accordance with the
arbitration provision of the MSA.
The MSA provision in dispute stated that a Contractor and Subcontractor shall not be obligated to
resolve disputes arising under this Subcontract by arbitration unless the prime contract has an
arbitration requirement and a particular dispute between Contractor and Subcontractor involves
issues of fact or law in which the Contractor is required to arbitrate under the terms of the prime
contract.
Procedural Posture
The district court denied SR Construction’s motion to compel arbitration, but the district court
denied the motion in favor of Peek. The court determined the provision did not extend to
subcontractor-respondent Peek, and since UHS was not named as a party, the matter was not
arbitrable. SR appealed.
Discussion
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The question before the Court on appeal was whether the arbitration mandate of the agreement
applied to the agreement in dispute here.
SR argued that since the contract contained a valid arbitration provision, the mandate applied to
the contract between the appellant and the appellee. In addition, SR argued that the dispute
involves issues of fact or law which the Contractor is required to arbitrate under the terms of the
prime contract. The respondent argued that the arbitration mandate applied to agreements between
the appellant-contractor and the project owner (UHS), and not subcontractors such as the appellee.
Therefore, Peek reasserted his position that the obligation for subcontractors to arbitrate all
disputes is unreasonable.
The Court cited several cases2 where the strong presumption toward arbitration has been
demonstrated. The Court, citing 1 Commercial Arbitration § 6:9, noted that the deference to this
presumption is greater in cases like the instant one where the arbitration agreement is broad. They
defined a broad arbitration agreement as one that “encompasses all disputes related to or arising
out of an agreement”. The presumption can be rebutted by showing evidence of the intent for
subcontractors to be exempt from the arbitration clause.3 Here, the Court rejected Peek’s argument
that it would be absurd to require the arbitration of all contractor disputes, noting that this mere
assertion did not constitute evidence sufficient to rebut the presumption or negate the intent for the
provision to apply to the MSA.
The Court noted that even if the provision was not read broadly, the consolidation provision of the
prime contract4 further illustrates the reasonability of the presumption that terms of MSA are
applicable to prime agreements and vice versa. Citing Eversole v. Sunrise Villas VIII Homeowners
Ass'n,5 the court identifies the preference for consolidating cases in the interest of judicial
expediency. Despite UHS not being named as a party in the instant dispute, the court held that the
MSA provision covers Peek's dispute because it raises issues of fact and law regarding the
reasonableness of Peek's change orders that SR must arbitrate with UHS under the prime contract.
Therefore, the Court determined that SR’s relationships with Peek and UHS for the purposes of
this project were not so attenuated as to render UHS absent from the dispute altogether.
Accordingly, even with no express requirement in the MSA for Peek, the subcontractor, to arbitrate
disputes, the mandate could reasonably be incorporated by reference to the prime contract.
Conclusion
The Court held that the lower court erred in denying the appellant’s motion to compel arbitration
because, considering the broad arbitration provision, the agreement should have been interpreted
according to the presumption of arbitrability when Peek failed to present evidence sufficient to
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1285 v. City of Las Vegas, 112 Nev. 1319, 1323, 929 P.2d 954, 957 (1996).
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rebut the presumption. The Court, therefore, reversed the judgment of the lower court as an abuse
of discretion and remanded with instructions to order the case to arbitration.

